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NO. 66 DECEMBER 2020 Introduction 
A Gangster’s Paradise? 
Transnational Organised Crime in the Covid-19 Pandemic 
Maria Dellasega and Judith Vorrath 
Since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, certain illegal business practices, such 
as the trade in counterfeit medical products, have been experiencing a boom. Other 
typical sources of income for organised crime (OC) temporarily dried up due to lock-
downs, travel restrictions and border closures. With the changing infection dynamics 
and increasingly localised countermeasures, the situation has demanded constant 
adaptation from many businesses – and criminal organisations are no exception. The 
effects of the pandemic on OC are not only short-lived, however: the economic, social 
and political consequences can also impact OC in the medium term. In addition to 
shifts in illegal (drug) markets, the potential for criminal exploitation could increase 
as a result of the health crisis and the influence of criminal groups on the state and 
society could grow. Some of these developments are already visible. The associated 
risks require increased scrutiny by political decision-makers and law enforcement 
agencies and more targeted international cooperation. 
 
After the first wave of coronavirus, it did 
not take long for the media to report an 
increase in illicit business practices. It was 
primarily the trade in counterfeit masks, 
disinfectants or test kits and the fraudulent 
sale of alleged treatments or vaccines for 
Covid-19 that made the headlines. But the 
impact of the pandemic went far beyond 
that. 
Crime During the First Lockdown 
It is hardly surprising that, as soon as the 
pandemic hit, criminal actors immediately 
tried to profit from the shortage of medical 
goods, the rapid and often unbureaucratic 
disbursement of aid payments and the 
strong increase in digital transactions. A 
large proportion of the criminal offences 
directly linked to the pandemic fell into the 
category of fraud, including online credit 
card fraud and the forging of websites to 
divert donations away from real charities. 
There was also an increase in online drugs 
trafficking and distribution of child sexual 
abuse material. 
However, the health crisis also presented 
OC with challenges: travel restrictions, 
border closures and lockdowns interrupted 
illegal supply chains and transport routes. 
In Mexico, the production of fentanyl and 
methamphetamine apparently declined 
because chemical precursors could not be 
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imported from China to the same extent 
as before. In addition, the smuggling of 
cocaine to Europe and the United States 
was hampered at various stages of the sup-
ply chain. It has also been more difficult 
for networks and gangs to deliver drugs to 
users, forcing them to make greater use of 
the postal service or couriers disguised as 
“essential workers” during lockdowns. In 
some places, the restrictions imposed on 
mobility were temporarily accompanied 
by a significant decline in offences such as 
pickpocketing and burglary carried out by 
organised criminal groups. Certain criminal 
sources of income, such as human smug-
gling, dried up almost entirely in places; 
subsequently stranding many migrants 
along the smuggling routes. 
However, these developments primarily 
resulted from the restrictive measures taken 
at the beginning of the pandemic. How 
Covid-19 will affect organised crime in the 
medium term depends, among other things, 
on how the infection rates and related 
restrictions continue to develop. That said, 
far-reaching economic, social and political 
consequences are already becoming appar-
ent. Even if OC phenomena differ signifi-
cantly across regions and countries, related 
criminal activities are often not only trans-
national, but interconnected across differ-
ent continents. Moreover, illegal and legal 
markets are often intertwined in many 
ways. Consequently, the ongoing pandemic 
will inevitably have an impact on cross-
border OC that goes beyond the short-term 
shifts mentioned above. The four develop-
ments described below pose particular 
risks. 
New Opportunities for Profit 
Criminal networks usually respond quickly 
to new profit opportunities. The trade in 
falsified and substandard medicines and 
medical products has long been a profitable 
business (see SWP Comment 25/2019) and 
the nature of related criminal activities as 
well as the modus operandi were not neces-
sarily any different after the outbreak of 
Covid-19. However, the pandemic offered 
new opportunities for criminal actors, espe-
cially due to the sharp rise in demand for 
certain medical goods. 
Yet, the consequences of Covid-19 for 
the legal economy affect illegal business 
and trade flows in other ways as well: 
Criminal actors can, for example, benefit 
from supply shortages in legal markets, 
which have occurred due to temporary 
restrictions on the production of certain 
goods during lockdown. These criminals are 
in a position to meet part of the demand, 
largely through counterfeit products. This 
applies not only to pharmaceutical products 
and medical supplies, but to all kinds of 
consumer goods and durables. This busi-
ness could also flourish if consumers who 
have lost income as a consequence of the 
pandemic increasingly resort to cheaper 
counterfeits and smuggled products, such 
as cigarettes. This situation certainly creates 
risks for the end users, who are not neces-
sarily aware of the origin of the goods due 
to the interconnectedness of legal and 
illegal markets. 
A second field that promises more profits 
beyond the short term are criminal activ-
ities in the virtual space. On the one hand, 
it can be assumed that even when the pan-
demic subsides, the increase in legal and 
illegal services provided online will con-
tinue. On the other hand, advancing digita-
lisation is generally increasing the potential 
for cybercrime, such as online fraud, phish-
ing or attacks with ransomware. For crimi-
nal networks, this development opens up 
various sources of profit. Because of the 
lower barriers to access the online market, 
this potential profit can also be tapped into 
by new players who do not necessarily fall 
into the organised crime category. The situa-
tion in the international drug trade is rather 
different. First and foremost, due to the fact 
that the substances being traded are pro-
hibited – with a few local or national excep-
tions in the case of cannabis (products) – 
the drug trade takes place almost entirely in 
the illegal sphere. 
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Shifts in the International 
Drug Trade 
The impact of the pandemic on the drug 
trade is particularly relevant for two 
reasons. First, the drug business remains 
the most lucrative source of income for OC 
worldwide. The retail value in the European 
Union (EU) alone is estimated at 30 billion 
euros annually. Second, due to shifts of 
power at different stages along the supply 
chain, there is a risk of longstanding ar-
rangements between criminal actors un-
ravelling – with possible negative con-
sequences such as an increase in violence. 
International reports, from Europol 
for instance, regularly point out that OC 
groups – particularly those engaged in 
the international drug trade – are exploit-
ing the increase in global trade flows and 
mobility. But what happens if these general 
conditions start to falter? 
The markets for cocaine and heroin in 
particular are susceptible to disruptions 
in interregional transport routes. Although 
the transactions of the sale can be completed 
via the Internet, including the darknet, 
physical smuggling must first take place 
over long distances – in the case of cocaine, 
mainly from the Andean region, and in the 
case of heroin, mainly from Asia, especially 
Afghanistan and Myanmar, but also from 
Mexico and other Latin American countries. 
From there, the substances need to be traf-
ficked to the main destination markets, pri-
marily Europe and North America. Appar-
ently, the pandemic has had little impact 
on the harvest in the areas where plants 
are traditionally grown to produce drugs; 
in fact, it is generally expected that the 
economic crisis will lead to an expansion 
of cultivation. Nevertheless, the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
has observed rising prices in Europe and 
a decline in the quality of drugs such as 
cocaine. It seems that supply shortages have 
forced some users to switch to prescription 
drugs. With regard to heroin, Europol 
also concluded, based on rising prices and 
declining quality, that this drug was less 
available on the key market. In contrast, 
the increased demand for cannabis prod-
ucts in Europe during the first lockdown 
was met more easily because of the much 
shorter supply chains. 
Prices could “normalise” quickly if the 
pandemic were to be effectively contained 
in Europe and North America. However, 
interregional drug trafficking will remain 
hampered, at the very least, for the foresee-
able future, partly because of reduced inter-
national air traffic and tighter controls at 
some key borders. According to the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization, 186 
airports worldwide were still completely or 
partially closed by the end of October 2020. 
The established criminal organisations are 
being very creative when it comes to re-
sponding to the restrictions on smuggling. 
For example, it has been reported 
that drones have increasingly been used to 
transport drugs across the closed U.S.-Mexi-
can border. As well as using more elaborate 
technologies, criminal organisations some-
times had to take higher risks because of 
the pandemic conditions, for example by 
smuggling opiates overland in Central Asia. 
This is one of the reasons why heroin traf-
fickers currently seem to be increasing the 
transport of drugs to Europe by sea along 
the southern route across the Indian Ocean. 
Changes can also be observed along the 
maritime routes of cocaine trafficking to 
Europe. Numerous drugs seizures in Euro-
pean ports during the summer suggest 
that these continue to be important entry 
points. However, the volumes confiscated 
could also indicate that larger quantities 
of cocaine are being transported in in-
dividual shipments. Most notably, the 
newly imposed or extended measures 
for fighting the pandemic are likely to im-
pede the further distribution of cocaine 
over land. 
Such developments could also affect the 
consumption in key markets such as Europe 
or the USA. With rising prices, consumers 
might increasingly use synthetic opiates, 
which can be produced closer to the market 
instead of heroin. Cocaine competes with 
new psychoactive substances and (meth)am-
phetamines, which are also produced in 
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Europe. With the reintroduction of curfews 
and closure of venues in Europe and else-
where in autumn 2020 and with economies 
barely recovering, it will take some time 
before the demand for recreational drugs 
such as cocaine picks up again. After the 
2008 financial crisis, for example, users 
increasingly switched to cheaper synthetic 
or mixed drugs. Accurately predicting fu-
ture demand is difficult. However, UNODC 
reported a sudden drop in the price of 
opium in Myanmar in the summer, and 
falling cocaine prices, especially in Peru. 
This may be a sign of declining demand, 
but also disrupted supply chains. 
The international trade in drugs will 
remain very profitable. However, restric-
tions related to Covid-19 and the economic 
consequences of the pandemic will require 
constant adjustments by the criminal actors 
involved. The uncertainties on the market 
already seem to have led to stronger, even 
predatory competition in some places. In 
Central America and Mexico, for example, 
an increase in violence between criminal 
groups has been observed, which is attri-
buted to the struggle over a shrinking core 
market and access to trade routes. Despite 
the lockdown, the homicide rate in Mexico 
reached a new record high in March, 
and violence against civilians has also 
increased. Violent clashes may also be 
fuelled by the fact that some groups are 
experiencing declining returns from 
protection rackets in territories under their 
control. At the very least, some groups 
are trying to diversify their sources of 
income, such as gangs in Central America 
entering the cocaine and cannabis trade as 
a sideline. Shifts in the drug trade could 
also have serious effects in cultivation 
areas. During the lockdown in Colombia, 
violence against civilians has been 
concentrated in certain provinces, for 
example in Cauca, where various criminal 
organisations are fighting over the control 
of the growing areas. Market changes could 
even have consequences for the peace 
process in Afghanistan, as the Taliban’s 
sources of financing include heroin produc-
tion as well as taxes on opium poppy culti-
vation and the trafficking of drugs. 
However, the effects of the pandemic on 
the drug trade are not limited to cultivation 
and transit areas. A report on the impact 
of Covid-19 on European drug markets con-
cludes that criminal transactions along the 
supply chain in Europe are taking place in 
an increasingly volatile environment and 
that this instability has already led to in-
creased violence among mid-level suppliers 
and distributors. Even before Covid-19, there 
were indications of increasing competition 
in the international cocaine trade, triggered, 
among other things, by new groups entering 
the market alongside the dominant Colom-
bian and Italian criminal organisations. If 
the pandemic lasts for a longer period, in-
ternationally well-connected organisations 
may have important advantages. This espe-
cially applies to those that control the entire 
supply chain from the cultivation areas to 
the destination markets, such as the Alba-
nian organisation Kompania Bello, which 
was targeted by a European law enforce-
ment operation in September. Other groups 
could engage in more violent crime when 
faced with reduced profits. Thus, pandemic-
related shifts in the international drug trade 
could also affect European internal security. 
Vulnerability to Criminal 
Exploitation Increases 
Almost a year after the outbreak of Covid-
19, it is already apparent that social resili-
ence to OC is declining as a result of the 
health crisis. Certain groups of the popula-
tion are becoming more vulnerable to ex-
ploitation by criminal organisations. 
The World Bank estimates that Covid-19 
will increase the number of people living in 
poverty by about 115 million. People from 
middle-income countries, those living in 
cities and those with a higher level of edu-
cation, in particular, will slide into poverty 
because of the pandemic. As a consequence, 
they are at a higher risk of being recruited 
by criminal groups and becoming victims 
of sexual or labour exploitation. 
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Previous experience shows that human 
trafficking increases after the outbreak of 
an epidemic. The UN Special Rapporteur 
on Human Trafficking stated in October 
that “more people are at risk [...] especially 
in the informal economy”. Traffickers could 
easily take advantage of the desperate situa-
tion many people find themselves in. Many 
people in informal employment have simply 
lost their income during the pandemic. In 
the absence of government aid, there is a 
real danger that they will turn to criminal 
organisations for support. Children are also 
at greater risk. For example, in Colombia, 
as many children already joined organised 
criminal groups in the first half of 2020 
as in the whole of 2019. The long school 
closures in some places and the additional 
time children are spending online at home 
have also significantly increased the threat 
of child sexual abuse via the Internet. Euro-
pol expects a longer-term increase in such 
cases and a growing demand for online 
material of this type. 
With the pandemic, the detection of 
human trafficking has also become more 
difficult as its impact on public life and 
mobility has pushed crime further under-
ground. Moreover, the assistance usually 
provided to victims has been partly sus-
pended or reduced. 
Another negative impact is that many of 
the millions of migrant workers worldwide 
have been stranded since the start of the 
pandemic. In Lebanon, countless domestic 
workers from African countries have simply 
been thrown out on the street by their em-
ployers due to the economic crisis, which 
was further exacerbated by the pandemic. 
Often left without identity papers or money, 
many cannot return home and only very 
few receive support from social services 
or embassies. In the Gulf region, reported 
cases of labour exploitation have tripled 
since the beginning of the pandemic. 
Migrants are regularly deprived of wages, 
while their debts to pay recruitment fees 
and living expenses continue to rise. In 
such situations, workers are easy targets 
for (further) exploitation. 
In general, people who are smuggled 
across borders are also at higher risk of 
becoming victims of human trafficking. 
Overall, Covid-19 has exacerbated the situa-
tion for migrants along the smuggling routes. 
The 85 percent drop in irregular migration 
at European borders from March to April 
2020 was primarily due to the temporary 
interruption of transport routes. The major-
ity of migrants who reach Europe from 
North Africa use the services of organised 
smuggling networks. Given the changing 
conditions, these networks are demanding 
more money from migrants and are more 
likely to exploit them or sell them on for 
exploitation. 
In European countries, the recession 
is expected to increase the potential for 
labour exploitation in sectors such as 
the hospitality industry, for instance. In the 
field of prostitution, many established 
criminal groups have quickly found ways 
of adapting their business model during 
the lockdowns. But for those who are forced 
to work in these sectors, the more difficult 
business environment will often mean they 
earn less while the conditions will tend to 
become even more dangerous and humili-
ating. In Italy, thousands of women from 
Nigeria who were coerced into working in 
the sex business have been without income 
because of lockdowns and continue to be 
harassed by debt collectors. The growing 
potential for various forms of exploitation 
by criminal groups thus requires more 
robust responses and greater prevention 
efforts within the EU as well. 
Widening Scope for Influence of 
Criminal Groups 
The consequences of the pandemic could 
also strengthen the influence of criminal 
organisations in the public sphere. Firstly, 
OC will have more opportunities to infil-
trate the legal economy. The economic 
ramifications of the lockdowns and restric-
tions open up additional opportunities 
for OC to support or completely take over 
weakened companies – for example in the 
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transport, catering or tourism industries. 
Particularly in contexts where government 
aid programmes are not effective, such as in 
the informal sector, OC groups can step in 
as convenient and unbureaucratic lenders. 
This not only facilitates money laundering, 
but creates dependencies and loyalties in 
different segments of the population. 
Second, criminal organisations also try 
to access financial resources from official 
assistance programmes themselves. For 
example, the Calabrian mafia ‘Ndrangheta 
has tried to obtain Italian aid through com-
panies in the steel sector. Transparency 
International has warned that organised 
criminals are likely to take advantage of 
national and European aid, such as the EU 
Recovery Fund. The increased and acceler-
ated disbursement of aid funds provides OC 
a wide range of opportunities for embezzle-
ment, bribery or to take on public contracts, 
especially in the health sector that is cur-
rently so important. This not only allows 
criminal organisations to increase their 
profits, but also enables them to access 
public funds and sectors. Depending on 
the environment, this can lead to new links 
and dependencies between criminal and 
state actors. 
Third, many places are likely to see an 
increase in corruption as a result of the 
pandemic. Therefore, criminal organisa-
tions may find it even easier to conduct 
their illegal operations. In the shadow of 
the Covid-19 crisis, arrangements between 
the political and criminal spheres – for 
example political decision-makers protect-
ing certain criminal groups in exchange for 
financial support in election campaigns – 
could be strengthened in some countries. 
Given the serious economic consequences 
of the pandemic, this is especially likely 
in some of the world’s fragile states. 
How these three aspects interact and 
how much OC can actually expand its in-
fluence on state and society, will vary 
greatly depending on the context. A state 
that was already weak before the pandemic 
will presumably continue to lose legitimacy 
among its population if criminal groups 
efficiently assume state-like functions. 
Criminal organisations that already have 
a territorial stronghold and provide some 
kind of governance will react differently to 
the crisis than loose networks with no local 
power base. For example, various OC groups 
provided their own form of support and 
security measures in the fight against the 
pandemic. Criminal organisations portrayed 
themselves as “benefactors” in the commu-
nities they controlled. A good illustration 
of this is the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico, where 
one of the daughters of El Chapo, the for-
mer leader of the cartel, distributed aid 
packages in its name to people in need – 
printed with images of her father. Also in 
the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, criminal gangs 
depicted themselves as guarantors of public 
safety and health care. By sending text mes-
sages to the residents, they made it clear 
that the government forces had failed to 
combat the virus and that the members of 
the groups themselves would implement 
health protection measures, even using 
force. More recently, various mafia groups 
in Italy have been mobilising against the 
renewed lockdown and attempting to stir 
up distrust against the Italian state. How-
ever, it seems relatively unlikely that the 
pandemic will enable new groups to domi-
nate and govern particular territories that 
they have not previously controlled. 
Not a Gangster’s Paradise, 
But Increased Risks 
With the spread of Covid-19 and related 
countermeasures, the conditions for OC 
have changed, but they have not necessarily 
improved across the board. In the short 
term, new opportunities for profit are ac-
companied by logistical obstacles and in-
creased risks at different points along the 
smuggling routes. The world will probably 
not become a “gangster’s paradise”, but 
there are signs of developments that could 
have a negative impact on state and human 
security. These developments depend not 
only on the further course of the pandemic 
and the measures taken against it, but also 
on the economic, social and political con-
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sequences of the crisis. As these vary region-
ally and nationally, different responses are 
also needed from Germany and the EU. 
In some areas, the EU can take direct 
action internally, for example by addressing 
“enablers” of OC such as corruption or 
money-laundering. Western countries can 
also expect OC to increasingly infiltrate 
the legal economy and to divert funds from 
Corona emergency plans and financial assis-
tance programmes. To prevent this, best 
practices of due diligence, transparent allo-
cation processes and real-time audits will 
remain crucial, as has been emphasised by 
UNODC. The lockdowns have not strength-
ened criminal organisations on the whole. 
The Neapolitan Camorra, for example, has 
apparently become “hungrier” rather than 
stronger under the conditions of the pan-
demic. Such actors will increasingly exploit 
any weakness of the state, the judiciary and 
civil society to improve their own position. 
In many cases, however, we need to look 
beyond Europe – if only because the con-
sequences of Covid-19 are affecting prac-
tically all regions of the world and the EU 
is connected to them in many ways through 
illegal markets and OC activities. Seizures 
of large cocaine shipments, such as the 
one in October in the port of Antwerp, are 
an indicator that global flows have not 
been interrupted. To some extent, however, 
there seems to have been a change in the 
means of transport, routes and modus 
operandi. 
This makes a continual analysis of rele-
vant shifts along the supply chain even 
more important. Another question that 
deserves attention is the extent to which 
legal international trade will change after 
the pandemic due to a possible increase in 
“de-coupling” and what consequences this 
would have for illicit interregional trade. 
Something else that should be closely moni-
tored in the context of the drug trade is the 
possible increase in violence and instability 
if changes in criminal groups’ arrange-
ments and routes prove to be more long 
term. The effects of such upheavals could 
also manifest themselves in conflict areas 
that are cultivation or transit sites for drug 
trafficking. From Colombia and Haiti to 
Afghanistan and Mali, shifts in illicit trade 
could become a factor in fragile peace and 
stabilisation processes in which Germany 
and the EU are involved in various ways. 
International cooperation in combating 
OC is becoming more important than ever, 
even beyond these aspects. In the medium 
term, the financial situation of many states 
(including those in the West) will be strained. 
It is rather unlikely that law enforcement 
agencies will be able to “upgrade” enough 
to keep pace with the changes in OC, espe-
cially in terms of IT expertise and technical 
equipment. The reduction or temporary 
suspension of social services as well as re-
strictions affecting civil society initiatives – 
whether directly as a result of the pandemic 
measures or in the medium term as a result 
of declining budgets – will also have a 
negative impact. 
It will therefore become even more cru-
cial to not only cooperate across borders in 
the area of law enforcement, through the 
exchange of information and administra-
tive assistance, but also to develop joint 
approaches for responding to OC at the po-
litical, civil society and private sector level, 
across countries and regions. 
Global forums are not necessarily the 
best suited starting point for this. Although 
this year’s conference of the parties to 
the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime took place in a hybrid 
format, there was a lack of opportunities 
for informal consultation and the participa-
tion of non-governmental organisations. 
The UN Crime Congress, postponed to 
March 2021, can provide a framework for 
discussing the new challenges posed by 
Covid-19. But it is not to be expected that 
the Congress will provide strong momen-
tum, if only because of the lack of consen-
sus on politically sensitive issues. 
Cooperation with third countries and 
neighbouring regions is therefore even 
more relevant for Europe. Germany and the 
EU are linked with other parts of the world 
through OC in many ways. First, a better 
understanding of the nature of these links 
and the interests of the affected states is 
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needed. Second, security, foreign and devel-
opment policy priorities must be coordinated 
with action for combating and preventing 
OC internally. For example, the increased 
potential for criminal exploitation as a 
result of the pandemic, requires special 
attention of politicians, law enforcement, 
the judiciary and social services across 
Europe. At the same time, the authorities 
along the trafficking routes to Europe need 
to clearly identify cases of human traffick-
ing, despite its overlap with the smuggling 
of migrants. As early as 2018, Interpol com-
mented in a report on OC in West Africa 
that “exploitation is often overlooked in 
favour of issues of illegal migration, some-
times leading to the re-victimization of 
those who have been smuggled across bor-
ders”. This problem is likely be exacerbated 
by the pandemic. Here the EU should set 
clear priorities in its cooperation with third 
countries to combat human trafficking 
and exploitation in a more targeted man-
ner. Interregional programmes such as 
the Organized Crime for West Africa Region 
(OCWAR) projects recently launched by the 
EU with separate components on traffick-
ing, cybercrime and money laundering, are 
a useful approach. A continuous exchange 
of concepts, instruments and best practices 
in dealing with OC across the silo structures 
of internal and external departments and 
policies would also be a step forward. Such 
an exchange will be all the more relevant 
when it comes to accurately identifying the 
dangerous effects of the pandemic on trans-
national OC and effectively countering them 
under more difficult circumstances. 
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